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At Long Last Credibility:
The Role of the Attorney for the State Under
Indiana's New Juvenile Code
DAVID W. BAHLMANN*
STEPHEN J. JOHNSON**
Following the creation of the first juvenile court act,1 there was a
significant time lapse before any meaningful discussion appeared in the
literature on the role of the attorney for the state in juvenile court. While
little has been written to explain this apparent lack of attention perhaps
an examination of the juvenile court concept itself will give one some in-
sight into the area.
As is widely known, the creators of the juvenile court movement saw
the criminal law as an oppressive failure. The public seemed appalled by
the application of adult procedures and sentences to children and set out
to create a court where the state, through the exercise of its power of
"parens patriae," could act as a wise and benevolent parent.2 Because the
various acts that have passed since the creation of the original court were
the products of individual state supreme court rules or statutes, the pro-
cedures have varied from state to state. Even with the constitutionaliza-
tion of certain of these juvenile procedures by the United States Supreme
Court in Kent v. United States3 and In re Gault,4 as late as 1968 only two
states5 required appearances by prosecuting attorneys.
Although Indiana had passed its first juvenile code in 19036 and com-
pleted a major revision and codification of the state's juvenile statutes in
1945, 7 it was not until 19788 that the General Assembly saw fit to
specifically establish a statutory role for the state's attorney, the pros-
ecuting attorney and the attorney for the department of public welfare,
his civil counterpart in juvenile matters. 9
*J.D. 1965, Valparaiso University. Former Prosecuting Attorney 67th Judicial Circuit
of Indiana (Porter County); member of the Juvenile Justice Division, Indiana Judicial
Study Commission: Director of Youth Services, Indiana Lawyers Commission, Inc.
**J.D. 1973, Indiana University-Bloomington. Director of Research, Indiana Pros-
ecuting Attorneys Council.
'The first act was allegedly created in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, although some
observers discount the accuracy of this claim. See, e.g., Fox, Juvenile Justice Reforrm An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
2M. PAULSEN,& C. WHITEBREAD. JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (1974).3383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-102(a) (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48 (West Supp.
1979).
6Act of March 10, 1903, ch. 237, § 10, 1903 Ind. Acts 522 (repealed 1945).
7Act of March 10. 1945, ch. 356, 1945 Ind. Acts 1724 (repealed 1945).
8Act of March 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 136, § 1, 1978 Ind. Acts 11ri (amended 1979).
'IND. CODE § 31-6-4-7(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). All citations herein to article 6 are from the
new Juvenile Code, effective October 1, 1979.
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In setting out this statutory role,'0 Indiana joined what seems to be a
national trend" by removing the decision to file a petition from the judge
and placing it in the hands of the attorney for the state. The basis for this
decision and the compromise reached to allow its inclusion within the
Code will be discussed within this article.
While it will be impossible to discuss each section of the Code, the ma-
jor areas of concern, as they pertain to the duties and functions of the at-
torney for the state, will be pointed out in hopes that those representing
the state will then be motivated to make an in-depth study and analysis
of the Code's provisions.
GENERAL PROVISIONS (CHAPTER 1)
Purpose Perhaps most significantly for the attorney for the state,
the Code, in its initial purpose and policy statements, 2 states the policy
of Indiana and the purpose of this article to be: "to provide a juvenile
justice system that protects the public by enforcing the legal obligations
children have to society."'' It goes on to state that even when using
diversionary programs as vehicles for providing "care, treatment,
rehabilitation, or protection' ' 14 for the children under its jurisdiction,
courts should "utilize diversionary programs which are consistent with
public safety.""
These provisions become even more significant when coupled with the
provisions of the section on dispositions'6 which allows a court to "order
temporary confinement in a detention facility for children or in the
juvenile part of the county jail for not more than ten (10) days"' 7 for those
children found to be delinquent children because they have committed an
act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.18
While some members of the Commission 9 felt that these provisions, if
allowed to be included within the Code, would simply turn Indiana's
juvenile justice system into a "mini-criminal justice system," it finally
was decided that to have any credibility with the public at all the Code
1oI&
"See IJA-ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION 25 (Tent. Draft, 1977, approved
February 12, 1979)[hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA]. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS (LEAA), JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION 503 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NAC- LEAA].
"IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Id § 31-6-1-1(1).
,Id § 31-6-1-1(3).
1I5& § 31-6-1-1(4).
"I-& § 31-6-4-16.
"Id. § 31-6-4-16(g)(5).
"Id. § 31-6-4-1(g).
"The 1975 Indiana General Assembly created a 24 member Juvenile Justice Division of
the Indiana Judicial Study Commission. IND. CODE § 2-5-8-1.1 (1976). The Division was
scheduled to go out of existence on January 1, 1978, but the termination was delayed until
October 1, 1979. Act of March 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 136, § 56, 1978 Ind. Acts 1196.
[Vol. 54:593
PROSECUTOR'S ROLE
had to first provide for the public's safety and to hold those who violated
its provisions accountable. As a compromise, however, it was hoped that
in doing so the same system would continue to treat children within its
jurisdiction as "persons in need of care, treatment, rehabilitation, or pro-
tection, ' 20 as had been provided within the 1945 Act. 2' Whether this can
be achieved will be seen.
Definitions While this section of the Code2 2 does not contain many
new terms with regard to the general practice of juvenile law, those at-
torneys assuming their duties under it for the first time should
familiarize themselves with these definitions so that in dealing with
juveniles under its provisions they will use the correct categories and
related procedures.
Two new terms which do appear for the first time are "secure facility"2 3
and "shelter care facility. '24 They will become particularly important at
hearings involving detention of a delinquent child25 or "detention of a
child in need of services ' 26 since the place of detention wherein a child is
placed will dictate the time frame in which the attorney must decide to
file his charges. 27
JURISDICTION (CHAPTER 2)
Juvenile Court-Original In this chapter,28 the Code provides for
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court, with one notable
exception, in the same general terms of prior acts.2 9 Article 6, the
Juvenile Law portion of Title 31 - Family Law, does not apply, however,
to "a child who violates: (1) any traffic law, if the child is sixteen (16)
years of age or older at the time of the violation; (2) any law regulating
the use or registration of watercraft or snowmobiles; or (3) any law pro-
tecting fish or wildlife." 0 Parts (2) and (3) dealing with watercraft,
snowmobiles and wildlife are new provisions of the Indiana law.
Also of significance to the attorney for the state in this area is the pro-
vision covering murder, which in the prior Code was not included in
juvenile court jurisdiction.2' Under the new Code the juvenile court has
"IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Act of March 10, 1945, ch. 356, § 1, 1945 Ind. Acts 1724 (repealed 1979).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'
31d "5
5Id- § 31"6-4-5.
2IcL § 31-6-4-6.
27See id § 31-6-7-6, which spells out the time frame in which an attorney must file his
charge and try his case or the child, if in "secure detention," may be released.
"Id §§ 31-6-2-1 to -4.
"Compare § 31-6-2-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with the 1978 version, § 31-6-2-1 (Supp. 1978).
See also id § 31-6-2-1.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979), for an exception to exclusive original jurisdic-
tion.
'IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1(a) (1976) (repealed 1979).
1979]
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exclusive original jurisdiction over children alleged to have committed
murder.3 2 This requires the attorney for the state to then "waive" the
child to adult court, as provided by law,33 unless he wishes the child to re-
main within the juvenile justice system.
Concurrent-Felony One of the most significant changes in this
chapter provides a resolution to a serious omission in prior codes. Under
former juvenile acts there was no mechanism provided for the attorney
for the state to extradite a child who had voluntarily left the state after
having committed a juvenile act that would be a crime if committed by
an adult. In such a case under the new law,34 the attorney for the state can
file the charge against the child in a court having felony jurisdiction
(under the regular general provision of probable cause) if he can show that
the act committed by the child is a felony 35 or murder, 36 that the child has
left Indiana,37 and that the state cannot obtain jurisdiction over him ex-
cept under proceedings for extradition of alleged felons.3 8 If the child's
return is secured in this manner, then the court having the felony
jurisdiction over the child shall immediately transfer him to the proper
juvenile court.3 9
Transfer From Criminal Courts This section40 answers the problem
of what to do with a child when it is discovered during an adult pros-
ecution that he is only a child. The Code provides that in such a case the
court having criminal jurisdiction "shall immediately transfer the case,
together with certified copies of all papers, documents, and testimony, to
the juvenile court." 4' The section then provides for the child's release "on
his own recognizance or to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon that
person's written promise. '42 However, the court may detain the child,
under provisions similar to the general criteria provided within the
general detention section for such a child,43 with the direction that, if de-
tained, he shall be detained in "a place designated by the juvenile
court."4 4 Finally, this section states for the first time a position that is
uniform throughout the Code: that children under the general jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court "may not be released on bail. 45
32ND. CODE § 31-6-2-1(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
3Id. § 31-6-2-4(c)(1).
3"Id. § 31-6-2-1.5.
"3Id. § 31-6-2-1.5(a)(1).
3IL
3'Id. § 31-6-2-1.5(a)(2).
1ld. § 31-6-2-1.5(a)(3).
39Id. § 31-6-2-1.5(b).
OMId. § 31-6-2-2.
"ld § 31-6-2-2(a) (emphasis added).
42Id. § 31-6-2-2(b).
3id. § 31-6-4-5.
44d. § 31-6-2-2(c).
4SId. § 31-6-2-2(d). In discussing this philosophical concept, the Commission remained
adamant that it did not want to involve children in what it considered to be the "evils of
the adult money bail system." While the Commission was not unanimous in this position
the exclusion of "bail for children" remains consistent throughout the Code.
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Waiver of Jurisdiction Perhaps the one choice that is the most im-
portant to the prosecuting attorney, in terms of the furtherance of his
duties regarding public safety, is the decision as to which children are ap-
propriate subjects for the juvenile system and which children, by virtue
of their histories and present conduct, should be "waived" or transferred
to the adult criminal justice system. This decision not only directly af-
fects the individuals involved but also may be the process that allows the
public in general to maintain its belief that the juvenile justice system in
fact "protects the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have
to society" 46 and yet at the same time "insures that children within the
juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, treatment,
rehabilitation, or protection.' 7
The procedures outlined within the new Code follow prior statutory
provisions in Indiana which have been modified and changed on many oc-
casions, primarily due to the directives of cases such as the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kent v. United States48 and its Indiana
counterpart, Summers v. State.9 The process is, by now, familiar to all at-
torneys who have become involved in these decisions over the years, but
the Code does offer two new sections which must be noted for proper im-
plementation.
First, since murder committed by a child is now within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the juvenile court,5" the prosecutor is required to
request waiver of those children whom he feels cannot be appropriately
handled within the juvenile system. The Code provides that any child ten
years of age or older when the act was allegedly committed shall be
waived, provided the other criteria are met.51 Some question may be
raised by defense counsel regarding this age requirement. Language in
another subsection of these provisions seems to suggest that a child
should be sixteen years of age to be waived for murder.5 2 However, this
second reference seems to be merely an inappropriate inclusion of law
dealing with violent acts in this general area of waiver, with the first pro-
vision clearly being the one which was intended to control in all murder
cases.63
"Id. § 31-6-1-1(1.
47Id. § 31-6-1-1(3).
"383 U.S. 541 (1966).
4"248 Ind. App. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967). See also Atkins v. State, 259 Ind. 596, 290
N.E.2d 441 (1972); Swinehart v. State, - Ind. App. -, 349 N.E.2d 224 (1976); Seay v.
State, - Ind. App. - , 337 N.E.2d 489 (1975), rehearing denied, - Ind. App. -,
340 N.E.2d 369 (1976); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974); State v.
Jump, 160 Ind. App. 1, 309 N.E.2d 148 (1974).
"See IND. CODE § 31-6-2-1.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979), for an example of concurrent original
jurisdiction in the juvenile court.
"Id. § 31-6-2-4(c).
521d. § 31-6-2-4(d)(3).
"If such an issue is raised it can be appropriately met by the attorney for the state by
simply reminding the court that where two codified sections seem to be in conflict, one
being of a general nature, as in § 31-6-2-4(d)(3) which deals with the general area of "crimes
of violence" or "crimes against the person," as opposed to the specific nature of the provi-
1979]
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The other new provision in this area of the Code deals with the concept
of lesser included offenses.54 Under the new language, it is clear that in all
cases where a child is waived for one offense, the waiver applies not only
to that offense but to all included offenses. 6
PROCEEDINGS GOVERNING DELINQUENT CHILDREN
AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES (CHAPTER 4)
This chapter is critical to the attorney for the state as it sets out the
procedures to be followed in dealing with children within the juvenile
court system, as well as very carefully defining who shall have what
duties and how each function relates to the next. In writing this chapter,
the Commission realized that one of the strongest criticisms of the
juvenile justice systems of the past has been that in attempting to be in-
formal they have become as varied as the courts which administered
them.
By starting with very precise definitions of terms and then carefully
devising statutory provisions for each process, hearing and decision
made within the system, the Commission has now provided the
mechanism for a much more uniform approach to juvenile matters in In-
diana. It should be noted, however, that in outlining a uniform process
the Commission has been careful to allow maximum use of existing
systems wherever possible so as to limit the fiscal impact of implementa-
tion of the Juvenile Code on the respective counties. In fact, in those
counties which have faithfully followed not only the letter but the spirit
of prior rules and statutory regulations, the impact of implementation of
these procedures will be negligible.16
Definitions In developing definitions for the basic categories within
which children were grouped in prior laws, Indiana, like nearly every
other jurisdiction, had divided its handling of these children based upon
their activity or their condition. The traditional terms of "delinquent,"
"dependent," "neglected" and "abused" have also been commingled
with less definitive terms such as "status offender." While generally feel-
ing these terms were at best outdated, if not actually harmful, the Com-
mission finally decided that the important issue was not what label you
sions of § 31-6-2-4(c)(1) which was written to cover the crime of murder only, then the one
deemed to be the more specific shall prevail.
54Id. § 31-6-2-4(a).
"Id. See Blythe v. State, - Ind. App. -, 373 N.E.2d 1098 (1978), which agrees with
this provision even though the Blythe case was based on an older waiver statute which is
silent on this issue.
5For an excellent discussion of the overall effect of the provisions of this chapter on the
juvenile system of Indiana and the Juvenile Code itself, see Kerr, Forward. Indiana's New
Juvenile Code, 12 IND. L. REv. 1, 9-20 (1979). It should be noted that Mr. Kerr's article was
written as a review of Pub. L. No. 136, § 1, 1978 Ind. Acts 1196, and therefore does not
necessarily take into account any changes made in the law by the 1979 Indiana General
Assembly, through Pub. L. No. 276, 1979 Ind. Acts, which is an integral part of the now
complete Indiana Juvenile Code which becomes effective October 1, 1979.
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put on the child or his condition but how he was treated in the system.
Therefore, while it changed the traditional "labels" somewhat, the Com-
mission has really only reorganized the categories. The real change has
come in how children will be treated by the system, and as a result, the
Code specifies very definite policy directives for each of the role players
within the system.
The primary category which deals with the actions of a child is
designated "Delinquent acts; delinquent child." 57 The traditional ap-
proach of designating acts which would be crimes if committed by adults
as delinquent acts if committed by a child is continued, 58 although as
previously mentioned, this category now also includes murder. Some of
the traditional "status offender" acts are also included within the defini-
tion.59 However, while the new definition is not seemingly much different,
some important changes should be carefully noted.
First, "running away from home" has again been designated a delin-
quent act65 after having been an act of dependency since 1976.61 However,
under the new provision "running away from home" is an offense only if
done "without reasonable cause and without permission of [the] parent,
guardian, or custodian who requests his return. '62 Additionally, the
traditional acts of incorrigibility, ungovernability and being beyond the
control of a parent are continued under the terminology of acts which
constitute habitual disobedience.6 3 Again, however, it must be noted that
the act has been changed so that it only covers a child who "habitually
disobeys the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or
custodian." 6 4
The net effect of these changes is hard to predict. Some feel that the
emphasis on such terms as "without reasonable cause, ' 65 and
"reasonable and lawful commands ' 66 could lead to an increased involve-
ment of juvenile courts in internal family matters and even unwarranted
judicial supervision and limitation on traditional parental authority at a
time when many are calling for less court jurisdiction over these matters.
The hope is, however, that attorneys for the state, and juvenile courts as
well, will exercise appropriate restraint in dealing with matters under
these provisions.6 7
Finally, while curfew violation has been retained as a delinquent act,
'IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
181d. § 31-6-4-1(a)(1).
19Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(2) to -1(a)(5).
10Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(2).
"IND. CODE § 31-5-7-5(1976)(repealed 1979).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(a)(2)(Cum. Supp. 1979).
"Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(4). These traditional acts of delinquency were found in IND. CODE
§ 31-5-7-4.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1978)(repealed 1979).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
"Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(2).
66Id. § 31-6-4-1(a)(4).
'
7Kerr, Forward- Indiana's New Juvenile Code, 12 IND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
19791
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
and has been considerably rewritten to make it more understandable, 8 it
now carries a provision, added in the House of Representatives of the
General Assembly, that allows a city, town or county to "advance the
curfew time within its jurisdiction by not more than one (1) hour ' 6 9 if it
determines that the curfew times provided within the subsection are in-
adequate to the furtherance of reasonable public safety. Although the
Commission felt that in view of existing Indiana constitutional and case
law7 0 this provision was unconstitutional and had recommended its
removal from the 1978 version of the Juvenile Code, the 1979 session of
the General Assembly retained the subsection within its draft.
The attorney for the state will need to be particularly aware that being
able to prove that a child has committed a "delinquent act" will not
necessarily mean that he can prove that the child is a "delinquent
child."7' In order to sustain this burden of proof in cases of delinquent
acts which would be crimes if committed by adults, the attorney for the
state will need to prove only that the child committed the act. In cases
where the child is alleged to have committed a delinquent "status" of-
fense, however, the attorney for the state must prove not only that the
child committed the act, but also that the child "needs care, treatment, or
rehabilitation that he is not receiving, that he is unlikely to accept volun-
tarily, and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coer-
cive intervention of the court. 7
2
This section then, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the basic
underlying philosophy of the new Juvenile Code and what was in the
minds of the Commission as they drafted it. Clearly, as has been
previously pointed out, it was the intent of the Commission to hold
children accountable for their "criminal" acts. By doing this they felt
that they could provide for the public's safety and still maintain credi-
bility for a juvenile justice system. However, by making the additional
requirement of proof in cases of "status" acts, they made a clear state-
ment that a juvenile court should be used for "coercive intervention" on-
ly, and that such intervention should occur only when the child cannot, or
will not, voluntarily accept the "care, treatment, or rehabilitation" that
is needed.71 While the Code retains juvenile court jurisdiction over these
types of acts it cautions that judicial intervention should be used only
after all other efforts to deal with the problem have been exhausted.
The Code also provides a variety of options for the handling of juvenile
problems, which will be discussed later in this article, thereby reflecting
6 IND. CODE § 31-6-4-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
69Id § 31-6-4-2(d).
70See IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23. See also City of Indianapolis v. Sablica, 264 Ind. 271, 342
N.E.2d 853 (1976), overruling Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N.E.2d 590
(1939).
7 1See IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(b)(Cum. Supp. 1979).
1c § 31-6-4-1(b)(2).
73d
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the Commission's position that just because a child behaves in a certain
manner the place to deal with that behavior is not necessarily in the
juvenile court. The juvenile court should be used, in short, not as a "ser-
vice provider to children" but only where the public's or the child's
welfare is threatened or where, after exhausting local efforts at solution,
coercive intervention is needed to bring about a satisfactory solution to a
recurrent problem or condition. By being aware of this philosophy and
working toward its implementation, the professional participants within
the juvenile system, together with their clients, should be forced into
working as a team toward the various desired solutions rather than as in-
dividual players with no particular duties or obligations toward other
participants.
This philosophy is not only applicable to "delinquent acts" and the
"delinquent child"; it is also embodied within the Code's new approach to
the traditional areas of dependency, neglect and abuse. The Commission
combined all of the areas into one major area entitled "child in need of
services" 7' and in so doing, provided six basic areas of involvement for
the juvenile justice system. These can actually be grouped into three
general approaches.
First, subsection (1) of this section combines the former areas of
dependency or neglect into one by dealing with children whose mental or
physical condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of the
inability, refusa or neglect of the parent, guardian or custodian to pro-
vide the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, educa-
tion or supervision.75 This draft then combines the "condition" aspects of
dependency with the "fault" aspects of neglect and abuse.
Second, subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5 of the section encompass the
traditional acts of actual abuse, both physical and mental, through com-
mission or omission, and sexually exploitative behavior by the parent or
guardian or allowed by the parent or guardian.7 6 The last subsection in
section (a) of the definition deals with the child's acts against himself in
endangering his own health as well as the health of another and also his
refusal to voluntarily take corrective measures to deal with the problems
created by those acts or omissions.77
Finally, section (d) of the definition provides the usual religious exemp-
tion for parents in the "legitimate and genuine" practice of their religious
beliefs by allowing a rebuttable presumption to arise that the child is not
in need of services because of such practices alone. However, it should be
noted that this provision will not prevent emergency service or care for
the child under order from the juvenile court.78
"Id § 31-6-4-3.
T Id. § 31-6-4-3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
7 51d § 31-6-4-3(a)(2) to -3(a)(5).
"Id § 31-6-4-3(a)(6).
7I8d § 31-6-4-3(d).
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Taking Into Custody-Detention The Juvenile Code next provides
detailed procedures outlining by whom and how a child may be taken into
custody,79 what should happen once this occurs, 80 and when, where and
how he may be detained.81 While these procedures do not specifically
outline actual duties, or provide for an attorney for the state, one point
needs to be made. If children alleged to be delinquent are detained then
they are entitled to a "detention hearing" within forty-eight hours, ex-
cluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. 2 If children alleged to be
children in need of services are detained, they are entitled to a hearing
within seventy-two hours, with the same exclusion for Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays.83 The Code is silent as to any requirements that
counsel for the state take part in these hearings. However, should the
state wish to have a child detained beyond these time frames for any
reason, it will require that the attorney for the state be present when
these hearings are held to make these wishes known to the court. Also,
the attorney for the state needs to be acquainted with the provisions of
the "speedy trial" section within the Code,84 as discussed later in this
article, since the time frames for preparation, filing and trial of the state's
case are predicated on the time restraints outlined within that section.
The Decision to Charge This area of the Code finally brings
credibility to the functions of the attorney for the state within the
juvenile justice system. As has been previously noted, the judge under
preceding codes in Indiana has had the power to determine not only by
whom and how one would be charged, but also whether he was guilty and
what should be the disposition. In drafting the new law the Commission,
after much debate and research, decided that the traditional function of
the decision to charge should rest with the attorney for the state but com-
promised the area by still requiring that the attorney for the state per-
form this function by "request[ing] the juvenile court to authorize the
filing of a petition."'8 5 Whether this requirement will actually allow the
court to deny such a request and thereby place the decision to charge
back in the hands of the court is unclear, but at least the process now
seems to be in the hands of the attorney for the state.
Of course, alongside with this legitimization of the function of the at-
torney for the state is the responsibility to see that this power is properly
exercised and its inherent duties appropriately fulfilled. The Commission
realized that specifying which of the possible attorneys for the state (the
prosecuting attorney or the attorney for the department of public
welfare) perform which function might engender some difficulties.
"Id- § 31-6-4-4.
80M. §§ 31-6-4-7, -8.
"See id. §§ 31-6-4-5 to -6.5.
8"Id § 31-6-4-5(f).
"Ild. § 31-6-4-6(e).
4d. § 31-6-7-6.
"Id. §§ 31-6-4-9(a), -10(a).
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Primarily, the Commission wished to limit the need to hire large numbers
of new personnel to implement the Code, so it allowed for maximum
cooperation between the two agencies, and in fact, hoped that this would
occur. Only in the area of the delinquent act which would be a crime if
committed by an adult is there a limitation of representation.8 6 The pros-
ecutor alone has the power to request that a petition be filed, while in all
other areas both counsel may be involved with only two requirements:
any decision to file or not is final only to the office of the attorney making
the request (subject of course to the traditional rules of double jeopardy
and res adjudicata); 7 and, once such a decision to file is made, the office
of the attorney filing the matter is required to represent the state at all
hearings relating to that matter. 8
In performing these functions and in making these decisions the at-
torney for the state will need to work closely with the intake officer.8 9 It is
envisioned by the Juvenile Code that the intake officer will receive the in-
itial information regarding the child or his activities in writing, make a
preliminary inquiry if the intake officer wishes to proceed, prepare a
report of the findings of the inquiry together with any recommendations
for further action and forward that report to the appropriate attorney for
the state. After reviewing the report, the attorney for the state will make
the final decision as to what will be done with regard to the filing of a
petition. It should be noted that this referral procedure can be altered by
agreement of the parties, specifically the prosecutor and the court, to
allow for maximum use of existing systems operating within the state.90
Once the attorney for the state makes the decision to request the
juvenile court to authorize the filing of a petition, and the filing is
authorized by the court, the petition must be prepared according to pro-
cedures outlined by the Code. Specifically, the petition shall be verified
and must contain: (1) a citation as to the court's jurisdiction; (2) a citation
to the statute allegedly violated or prescribing the need for services; (3) a
concise statement of facts upon which the allegations are based; (4) the
child's name, birth date and address, if known; (5) the name and address
of the child's parent, guardian or custodian, if known; and, (6) the name
and title of the person signing the petition. It should be noted that any er-
ror or omission in the citation is grounds for dismissal or reversal of ad-
judication only if the error or omission misleads the child to his prejudice.'
Finally, the person filing may request in writing that the child be taken
into custody. The request must be supported by either sworn testimony
"Id § 31-6-4-9(a).
V'See id. §§ 31-6-4-7(e), 
-8(d).
"See id §§ 31-6-4-9(a), -10(a).
"An "intake officer" is defined as a "probation officer or a caseworker who performs the
intake, preliminary inquiry, or other functions specified by the juvenile court or this arti-
cle." Id § 31-6-1-2.
9See id §§ 31-6-4-7(e), -8(d). It should be noted that this "decision is final only as to the
office of the person making it." Id
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or affidavit and, if granted, the court must make written findings of fact
on the record of the grounds for detention.9'
The attorney for the state should further note that the court is man-
dated to authorize the filing of petitions if it finds probable cause to
believe either that the child is delinquent and it is in the best interests of
the public or the child that the petition be fied, or that the child is a child
in need of services.
Finally, the position of the attorney for the state with regard to re-
quested dismissals of petitions seems absolute, as the court shall dismiss
any petitions he has filed upon the motion of the person representing the
interests of the state.92
Initial Fact-Finding, and Dispositional Hearings Assuming that
the decision has been made not to handle the case through "informal ad-
justment"93 and that the petition to charge has been authorized and ap-
propriately filed, the attorney who filed the petition on behalf of the
state, as previously explained, will be required to represent the state at
all subsequent hearings. In outlining the various types of hearings that
would be required in the uniform handling of juvenile matters, the Com-
mission was acutely aware of the limitations of court and attorney time
to handle these hearings. Therefore, the attorney for the state should be
aware that many of the seemingly separate functions of these hearings
can be handled within one hearing and that the important requirement is
that the functions be appropriately carried out and made part of the
record.
In the "initial hearings" outlined within the Code, both for the delin-
quent child and the child alleged to be a child in need of services, 94 the
matters to be covered by the court could be covered at the beginning of
one hearing which would also include the matters to be heard in the "fact
finding" hearing. In fact, if the required "predispositional reports" have
been authorized, prepared and distributed, and all parties are prepared
and give their consent, the "dispositional hearing" 96 could be combined
with the above matters as well.
It is important that the attorney for the state remember that he should
approach these hearings with the same preparation and attention to
detail as he would their adult counterparts of arraignment, trial and
sentencing. This requires that he be sure that the court has advised the
child and the parent, guardian or custodian of all the required rights,
"See id. §§ 31-6-4-9, -10.
9Id. § 31-6-4-11. This provision is even stronger than its adult counterpart found at §
35-3.1-1-13(a), which requires the attorney for the state to list his reasons for the dismissal.
For an excellent discussion of the areas of "Initiating Formal Action" and the "Role of the
Prosecuting Attorney" under the new Juvenile Code see Kerr, Forward;- Indiana's New
Juvenile Code, 12 IND. L. REV. 14-16 (1979).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-12 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
9'See id. §§ 31-6-4-13, -13.5.
"Id. § 31-6-4-15.
"Id. § 31-6-4-16(a).
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duties and obligations they face and that these advisements are
understood and on the record. Also, it will be incumbent upon the at-
torney for the state to be sure that his motion for "waiver" is on file and
duly noted by the court 97 and that this motion is heard before the child is
allowed to admit the allegations of the petition or he will be foreclosed
from filing such a motion.99
Another point for the attorney for the state to remember is that if the
child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act, including any of the
"status" offenses, he is entitled to counsel unless the child waives this
right.9
The fact-finding hearing is the basic trial mechanism of the juvenile
court system and, as such, should be approached by the attorney for the
state the same as any trial. Evidence rules are generally not included
within the Juvenile Code except as later noted in this article; in delin-
quency matters the rules of evidence are the same, with some notable ex-
ceptions, as in adult criminal trials. The only important additional point
to remember in handling those hearings is that the court can withhold
judgment in the matter for up to twelve months unless the child or his
parent requests otherwise, in which case judgment must be entered
within thirty days. A second consequence of withholding judgment is
that it may subject the child to release from detention if the child is being
held in a secure facility."' The attorney for the state needs to be aware of
this so that a child is not mistakenly allowed to leave the court's jurisdic-
tion.
The dispositional hearing is perhaps the most important proceeding for
the attorney for the state. Here the court, after hearing all the evidence
and receiving the required reports, must try to devise a dispositional
decree consistent with the philosophy of treatment of juveniles, both
delinquent and in need of services, as outlined in subsection (d) of this sec-
tion of the Code.101 To do this he will need a strong advocate for the state
who has enlisted the help of the other professionals in the community in
outlining a plan that meets the needs of public safety and yet can actual-
ly rehabilitate the child. The new Code allows much leeway in for-
mulating these plans, from providing up to ten days in local correctional
facilities for those who commit delinquent criminal acts, to complete
emancipation for the child able to go out on his own. Restitution is
specifically provided for and state facilities can be used as well. To ac-
complish this task the attorney for the state will need to be aware of the
services available within his community and how effective such services
really are.
'
7See id. §§ 31-6-2-4, -4-13(d).
IId. § 31-6-2-4(e).
"See id. §§ 31-6-7-2, -3.
"'Id. § 31-6-4-14(e).
10'Id § 31-6-4-16.
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Finally, it is very important that the attorney for the state be sure that
once the court has rendered its decision and it has been duly recorded and
explained to all concerned, that the court then advise the child and his
parents of their right to appeal and close the record.102 While these tasks
may seem exclusively the function of the court the attorney for the state
will have to retry the case if it is reversed for an improper record, and he
should do all in his power to see that that does not happen.
Parental Participation The new Juvenile Code has created a pro-
cedure whereby the juvenile court may require parental 03 participation in
a program of care, treatment or rehabilitation of a child. The attorney for
the state, whether he is the prosecuting attorney or the attorney for the
county welfare department, may file a petition requesting such parental
participation.10 4 It is required that the child be adjudged a delinquent
child or child in need of services before a parental participation petition
can be filed. 105 At the initial hearing on a child in need of supervision
(CHINS) or a delinquent child the juvenile court must inform the parent
that if the child is adjudicated a CHINS or a delinquent child he may be
required to participate in a program of care, treatment or
rehabilitation. 100 Upon a finding that a child is a delinquent or CHINS a
predispositional report will be prepared by a probation officer or a
caseworker 0 7 which could recommend a program of parental participa-
tion.108 At the dispositional hearing the predispositional report may be
admitted, but the person representing the interests of the state must be
given a fair opportunity to controvert any parts of the report admitted in-
to evidence.10 9 Also, the juvenile court could hold a hearing on a petition
for parental participation concurrently with the dispositional hearing or
with any hearing to modify a dispositional decree. 10 A parent may con-
trovert any allegations at a hearing concerning a program of parental
participation,"' and is entitled to cross-examine witnesses, obtain
121Id. § 31-6-4-16(1).
'°
3
"Parental" here includes parents, guardians and custodians.
'
4 IND. CODE § 31-6-4-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The petition must be signed and verified and
is entitled "In the Matter of the Participation of __ , the Parent, Guardian, or Custo-
dian of ___." The petition must allege: "(1) the respondent is the child's parent, guar-
dian or custodian; (2) the child has been adjudicated a delinquent child or a child in need of
services; and (3) the parent, guardian, or custodian should: (A) obtain assistance in ful-
filling his obligations as a parent, guardian or custodian; (B) provide specified care, treat-
ment or supervision for the child; or (C) work with any person providing care, treatment or
rehabilitation for the child." Id.
'°Id. See also id § 31-6-4-16(d)(4), -16(i).
'
061d §§ 31-6-4-13(f)(1), -13.5(e)(1).
'
0IDefined as "any child welfare worker of the county department." Id § 31-6-1-2.
111d § 31-6-4-15(a), -15(b). Indeed, the Juvenile Code seems to indicate a preference for
parental participation. The predispositional report is to recommend a program for the child
that "provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian
or custodian" whenever it is consistent with the safety and welfare of the child and the
community. Id § 31-6-4-15(d).
19Id § 31-6-4-16(b).
"Id § 31-6-4-17.
"'Id § 31-6-4-13.5(e)(3).
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witnesses or evidence by compulsory process and introduce evidence on
his own behalf.112 If the juvenile court decides to order a program of
parental participation it must accompany its dispositional decree with
findings of fact concerning the need for such a program and must specify
its reasons for the disposition.'"
The juvenile court must advise the parent that failure to participate as
required by its order could lead to termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship."1 Further, failure to obey an order of the court is punishable as
contempt. 15 The juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the parent until
the child reaches twenty-one unless the court discharges the child or
parent at an earlier time 16 or until guardianship is awarded to the depart-
ment of correction."17 Additionally, the department of correction may
petition the court to reinstate jurisdiction over the child and his parent." 8
In summary, the attorney for the state may become involved in litiga-
tion concerning parental participation in a program for a child in several
different ways. He may be the one petitioning the court for a program of
parental participation. He may be contesting recommendations in a
predispositional report concerning parental participation, but it is more
likely that the attorney for the state would be in the position of sup-
porting the recommendations of the predispositional report against an
attack from the parent required to participate in a rehabilitation pro-
gram. This would undoubtedly be the case where a welfare caseworker
prepared the predispositional report and the attorney for the state is the
welfare attorney. The attorney for the state would also become involved
if the parent failed to comply with the juvenile court's order to par-
ticipate in a rehabilitation program. This may lead to an action to ter-
minate the parent-child relationship, which could be brought by either
the welfare attorney or the prosecuting attorney."9 Or, the parents may
be found in contempt of court.10 Since the failure to obey the disposi-
tional decree of the juvenile court would no doubt be indirect contempt of
court and, where the contempt is indirect criminal contempt, it must be
prosecuted by the state, 2 1 the prosecuting attorney may become involv-
ed in enforcing a dispositional decree ordering parental participation
through contempt proceedings.
'"I
2 d § 31-6-3-2.
"Id. § 31-6-4-160).
'"I § 31-6-4-17.
"Id § 31-6-7-15.
"16d. § 31-6-2-3(1).
'Id. § 31-6-2-3(2).
"'sId. § 31-6-2-3.
"'Id § 31-6-5-4.
"Id. § 34-6-7-15; LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958); Boggs v. State,
- Ind. App. -, 386 N.E.2d 992 (1979).
"'Allison v. State ex reL Allison, 243 Ind. 489, 187 N.E.2d 565 (1963); Denny v. State ex
reL Brady, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313 (1932).
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Periodic Review of Disposition At any time after the date of the
original disposition decree the juvenile court may order the county
welfare department or the probation department to file a progress report
on implementing the decree.1 22 Additionally, during any time the juvenile
court retains jurisdiction the court may modify the dispositional decree
on its own motion or upon the motion of a number of different in-
dividuals, including the prosecuting attorney and the county welfare at-
torney.'2
3
At least every nine months after a dispositional decree which removes
a child from his parent, and possibly more often if ordered by the juvenile
court, the court must hold a formal hearing to determine whether the
dispositional decree should be modified. 2 4 The court is to consider
whether the present placement of the child is still appropriate. 125 The
court is permitted to consider a list of statutory factors in making this
determination. 2 6 There is a presumption in favor of returning the child to
his parent. For the state to prevail, it must show that the child should not
be returned to his parent.'
27
At least eighteen months after the date of a dispositional decree the
juvenile court must decide whether it should continue to entertain
jurisdiction and it must hold a formal hearing on the matter. 2 8 On this
issue there appears to be a presumption against continued jurisdiction
for once again the state bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction
should be continued, and it must do this by demonstrating that the objec-
tives of the dispositional decree have not been accomplished and that a
continuation of the decree has a probability of success. 2 9 If the state does
'"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-19(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
12 I § 31-6-7-16(a).
1 4"Parent" will include guardian and custodian. Id § 31-6-4-19(6).
125I&
126 (1) The services that have been provided or offered to a parent, guardian or
custodian to facilitate a reunion.
(2) The extent to which the parent, guardian or custodian has enhanced his
ability to fulfill his parental obligations.
(3) The extent to which the parent, guardian or custodian has visited the
child, including the reasons for infrequent visitation.
(4) The extent to which the parent, guardian or custodian has cooperated
with the county department or probation department.
(5) The child's recovery from any injuries suffered before removal.
(6) Whether any additional services are required for the child or his parent,
guardian, or custodian and, if so, the nature of those services.
(7) The extent to which the child has been rehabilitated.
'Id.L This presumption against continued separation of parent and child reflects one of
the basic policies of the Juvenile Code: "to remove children from their families only when it
is in the child's best interest or in the interest of public safety." Id. § 31-6-1-1(6). The
burden of proof upon the state on this issue is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id-
§ 31-6-7-13(a).
1IM. § 31-6-4-19(c).
'"Id. As with the burden of proof in the nine-month review of a removal decree, the state
must sustain its proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 31-6-7-13(a).
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not meet its burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction should be con-
tinued the juvenile court may either discharge the child or his parent' 30 or
may authorize a petition for termination of the parent-child
relationship.'3 ' This second alternative is interesting because it arises if
the state fails to meet its burden of proof. There may be situations where
the state desires a termination of the parent-child relationship and thus
wants to "fail" in the burden of proof that has been placed on it, or ac-
tually attempt to prove the need for termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship.
Before the nine-month or eighteen-month reviews of the dispositional
decrees the probation department is to prepare a progress report.' As
with the predispositional report, the person representing the interests of
the state must be given a fair opportunity to controvert any parts of the
progress report admitted into evidence.' 33
Therefore, a prosecuting attorney or county welfare attorney is per-
mitted a role in post-dispositional proceedings, though he is not
statutorily required to attend any dispositional review hearing. He may
move to modify a dispositional decree at any time. If he chooses to urge
continued removal of a child from his parent or that the juvenile court
should continue to retain jurisdiction past eighteen months the burden is
upon him to demonstrate this necessity to the juvenile court.
TERMINATION OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP (CHAPTER 5)
Termination of the parent-child relationship may be done either with
the consent of the parents or against their will. If done with the parents'
consent the county welfare department or a licensed child placing agency
may sign a verified petition for the voluntary termination of the relation-
ship.'3 ' It must be alleged that termination would be in the child's best in-
terests and that the petitioner has developed a satisfactory plan of care
and treatment for the child.' 3 A petition to end the parent-child relation-
ship may be filed only by either the county welfare attorney or the pros-
ecuting attorney, and whichever one files the petition must represent the
interests of the state in all subsequent proceedings on the petition."36 Pro-
ceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship can be initiated only
after the child has been adjudicated a delinquent child or a child in need
of services, the child has been removed from the parents' custody for six
months after the adjudication, and the parents have been offered
WId. § 31-6-4-19(c)(2). The Juvenile Code repeats this alternative at § 31-6-4-19(g).
1'I&. § 31-6-4-19(c)(1).
'ICL § 31-6-4-19(d).
"'Id. § 31-6-4-19(0).
"13Id § 31-6-5-2(a).
1'Id. § 31-6-5-2(a)(3), -2(a)(4).
"36IC § 31-6-5-4.
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reasonable assistance in fulfilling their parental obligations and still have
not done so.137
Parents at a hearing to terminate the parent-child relationship are en-
titled to cross-examine witnesses, subpoena witnesses and evidence and
introduce witnesses on their own behalf."18 A parent is also entitled to
representation by counsel, including counsel appointed at state
expense.139 In addition, a child may be excluded from the hearing.1 40
Therefore, the county welfare attorney will quite probably be involved
in preparing a petition for the voluntary termination of the parent-child
relationship. Only the prosecuting attorney or county welfare attorney
has the authority to file a petition for involuntary termination.
PROCEDURE IN JUVENILE COURT (CHAPTER 7)
Generally If past appellate decisions on similar matters are any
gauge, the section of the new Juvenile Code dealing with procedures in
the juvenile court should be the most litigated section of the Code.
Therefore, this section should be carefully scrutinized by the attorney for
the state, especially the prosecuting attorney. A few of the more impor-
tant, or possibly controversial, sections will be examined here.
In all delinquency cases procedures governing criminal trials apply,
unless otherwise covered by the Juvenile Code.'4 ' Where a person is being
tried in juvenile court for a crime142 the laws governing criminal trials ap-
ply. 43 The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure apply in all other cases,
unless otherwise dictated by the Code.144
Appointment of Counsel A child alleged to be a delinquent child is
entitled to have counsel appointed for him at a detention hearing or at the
initial hearing, whichever is earlier.' 45 It is discretionary with the juvenile
court whether counsel is appointed for the child for any other
proceeding. 146 This particular language may be important to police of-
ficers who advise a delinquent or his parents of his rights. 47 Police in
their advisement of Miranda48 rights often advise a suspect of his right
'13 Id. § 31-6-5-3(6).
"MId § 31-6-3-2.
139Id& §§ 31-6-3-2(c), -5-3(7),-7-2(b).
I& § 31-6-7-10(d).
14id- § 31-6-7-1(a).
'
42The juvenile court has concurrent original jurisdiction in cases where adults are
charged with the crimes of neglect, contributing to delinquency, or violating the com-
pulsory school attendance law. Id § 31-6-2-1(c).
1431d § 31-6-7-1(b).
'441d- § 31-6-7-1(c).
'4Id § 31-6-7-2(a).
14'As will be discussed later in this article, one of the issues in determining whether a
waiver of rights during custodial interrogation is voluntary is whether the child, and his
parent or custodian have been advised of his right to the appointment of counsel. Id
§ 31-6-7-2(d)(6).
"'Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to the immediate presence of an attorney, then add that they have no way
of furnishing an attorney "but one will be appointed for you, if and when
you go to court." 149 Since the right to appointed counsel for a delinquent
does not occur until a detention or initial hearing, police officers might
specifically advise the delinquent suspect and his parents or guardian of
this limitation. The appointment of counsel provision also requires that
the attorney who represents a delinquent child not have a "conflict of in-
-terest."15 0 This language would seem unnecessary since an attorney with
a conflict of interest could probably not ethically151 or constitutionally
2
represent that client.
Waiver of Rights Perhaps no provision of the new Juvenile Code
will be more important to law enforcement officials than the waiver of
rights section.5 3 It is deserving of a separate law review in itself, but
there are some points that will be mentioned here. As juvenile confession
cases have developed through the years in Indiana a set of rules has
evolved. A juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him
unless he and his parents or guardian are informed of his constitutional
rights and are given an opportunity for consultation prior to questioning.
The record must demonstrate that there was a meaningful opportunity
for the juvenile and his parents to consult together.5 4 The waiver section
of the new statute borrows much of the language from the leading In-
diana decisions but changes their thrust. Under the case law a juvenile
could waive his rights if he and his parents or guardian were adequately
advised of his constitutional rights and had the opportunity for mean-
ingful consultation. Under the new Juvenile Code a juvenile may not
waive his rights alone. He must be joined in the waiver by his attorney or
custodial parent, guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem.
15
"'Gaddis v. State, - Ind. - , 368 N.E.2d 244 (1977); Dickerson v. State, 257 Ind.
562, 276 N.E.2d 845 (1972).
'
5
.IND. CODE § 31-6-7-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"'IND. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. DR 5-101 to 5-107.
"
2 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
.
5
.IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'
5 4Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976); Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288
N.E.2d 138 (1972).
'
5 5The text of the statute reads:
(a) Any rights guaranteed to the child under the Constitution of the United
States, the Constitution of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child, if the child
knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver, or
(2) by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem
if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child;
and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.
(b) The child may waive his right to meaningful consultation under subdivi-
sion (a)(2)(C) if he is informed of that right, if his waiver is made in the
presence of his custodial parent, guardian, custodian, guardian ad litem, or at-
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While it is anticipated that language in the statute identical to that
found in leading Indiana cases will be interpreted in the same way the
common law language has been, the statute may be more restrictive in
several instances. The statute begins by stating that "any rights
guaranteed to the child under the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of Indiana, or any other law" may be waived only in the
manner prescribed by the statute. 156 The leading Indiana cases dealing
with a juvenile's waiver of rights concerned only confessions or
statements made by the juveniles. The statute speaks of "any rights"
guaranteed to the child by the United States or Indiana Constitutions.
Without becoming involved in an academic discussion of what constitu-
tional rights a juvenile enjoys, it would seem that a juvenile would have a
right "to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.' '"57
Does the statute mean, for example, that a child could not give a consent
to search without ajoint waiver with a parent, guardian or attorney? The
first sentence of the statute speaks of rights guaranteed to the "child."
Child is defined by the Juvenile Code basically as a person under eighteen
years of age."5 8 Suppose that a police officer decides to question a suspect
who is under eighteen but tells the police officer that he is over eighteen.
The police officer proceeds in good faith to interrogate the person under
adult standards and obtains a valid confession by adult standards. The
Indiana Supreme Court has held that under such circumstances the con-
fession would be admissible, though in technical violation of its rules for
juvenile confessions. 169 Would the same results attach where "child" is
defined by statute and procedures for interrogation of a child are
specified by statute?
Next, the statute requires the joint waiver of rights by the juvenile
with either his attorney or with "the child's custodial parent, guardian,
custodian, or guardian ad litem.' ' 6 0 The term "custodial parent" ex-
cludes the non-custodial parent of the child, even if the custodial parent is
not available. "Guardian," "custodian" and "guardian ad litem" are all
defined by the Juvenile Code. 61 Guardian and guardian ad litem are
limited to a legally appointed person, while a custodian may be "a person
with whom a child resides." The Indiana Supreme Court has approved
meaningful consultation by a juvenile with a "de facto guardian"' 62 or a
"guardian acting in loco parentis. "163 While the individuals in both these
cases would not qualify as guardians under the new Juvenile Code, both
torney, and if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.
IND. CODEr§ 31-6-7-3(a), -3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1561&
'17U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
"SIND. CODE § 31-6-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"'Stone v. State, __ Ind. -, 377 N.E.2d 1372 (1978).
"'0IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"-'I. § 31-6-1-2.
"'Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 450 n.2, 346 N.E.2d 584, 586 n.2 (1976).
"'Burnett v. State, _ Ind. _, 377 N.E.2d 1340. 1342 (1978).
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would probably qualify as custodians within the meaning of that term in
the new law since the juvenile defendant was apparently living with the
consulted person in each case.
The waiver of rights provision also requires that the custodial parent,
guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem who joins the juvenile in his
waiver must have "no interest adverse to the child. 1 6 4 The exact mean-
ing of this term is uncertain but, if the term is construed consistently
with the intent of the previous Indiana cases on juvenile confessions, a
person will not be considered to have an interest adverse to the interests
of the child sihnply because he advises him to confess.1 6 The Juvenile
Code retains the requirement of Indiana case law for "meaningful con-
sultation" between the juvenile and another person, but its importance
would seem to be diminished where there must be a joint waiver rather
than a waiver by the juvenile alone.1 66 The child may waive his right to
meaningful consultation, but the waiver must be made in the presence of
the parent, guardian or attorney.16
The new Code also contains a statute similar to one contained in the
criminal statutes' 68 to measure the voluntariness of a waiver of rights
during custodial interrogation.1 69 The statute also adopts the constitu-
tional rule that a statement or confession given after an inadequate ad-
visement of rights, but otherwise knowing and voluntary, may be used to
impeach the child as a prior inconsistent statement if he testifies as a
witness.' 0
One final point should be mentioned. Except for proof that a child com-
mitted a delinquent act or that an adult committed a crime, which must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard of proof for any other
finding made by a juvenile court is preponderance of the evidence.17 1
Thus, a finding by the juvenile court that a child's statement was know-
ingly and voluntarily made could be based upon a preponderance of
"'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(a)(2)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'65Bpchanan v. State, - Ind. - , 376 N.E.2d 1131 (1978). In Buchanan, the supreme
court baid that its procedures for juveniles were designed "to afford the juvenile and the
mature person who, by nature, would have the best interest of the suspect uppermost in
his thoughts, the opportunity to reflect upon the predicament before making what may be
a critical decision." Id. at -, 376 N.E.2d at 1134. Cf Garrett v. State, 265 Ind. 63, 351
N.E.2d 30 (1976) (waiver of the right to remain silent must be shown to have occurred
beyond a reasonable doubt).
'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(a)(2)(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
16Id § 31"6-7-3(b).
'"IND. CODE § 35-5-5-2 (1976).
'69IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). As to a discussion of "custodial interro-
gation," see Johnson v. State, - Ind. -, 380 N.E.2d 1236 (1978); Bugg v. State, -
Ind. -, 372 N.E.2d 1156 (1978). Presumably, the new statutes on waiver of rights would
not affect a spontaneous utterance made by a juvenile, or where the statement was not a
product of custodial interrogation. Lockridge v. State, 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d 275 (1975).
'
70 IND. CODE § 31-6-7-3(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Johnson v. State, 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517 (1972).
'MIND. CODE .31-6-7-13(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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evidence. This would appear to change the rule in Indiana regarding
juvenile confessions. 172
Speedy Trial One of the most often litigated issues in the criminal
arena is the defendant's right to a speedy trial, primarily contested under
Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, CR 4. It has been held that the
criminal rules for a speedy trial do not commence until the child is waived
from juvenile court.173 The new Juvenile Code creates speedy trial rights
for juveniles which are primarily modeled upon the criminal rules for
speedy trials, with one noticeable distinction. The criminal rules do not
set a period of time for commencement of criminal action. Rather, the
time periods under the criminal rules begin either upon the arrest of the
defendant or when he is formally charged, whichever is later.'7 The
Juvenile Code establishes time limits in which a petition must be filed. If
a child is in detention a petition alleging delinquency must be filed within
seven days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) after he is
taken into custody."75 If he is not charged within seven days he is to be
released on his own recognizance or to his parents, guardian or a custo-
dian. 76 If the child is still in detention after a petition is filed then either a
fact-finding hearing or a waiver hearing must be held within twenty days
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) after the petition is
filed. 77 If the child is not in detention this time period is extended to six-
ty days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays).178 Failure to
comply with these time periods also requires release of the child on his
own recognizance or to his parents, 17 9 but delays caused by the child or
court congestion may extend the time.'80
If a waiver hearing is held and waiver denied the fact-finding hearing
must be commenced within ten days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays) after the denial.'8 1 If waiver is granted then Criminal Rule
4 applies on the date of the waiver order. 82
Similar to Criminal Rule 4,183 a child may not be held to answer a delin-
quency petition for more than one year in aggregate.8 4 Also copied from
Criminal Rule 4 are provisions excluding from the time periods delay
'2Garrett v. State, 265 Md. 63, 351 N.E.2d 80 (1676).
1'7State ex. reL Hunter v. Juvenile Court, 261 Ind. 624, 308 N.E.2d 695 (1974).
1
4 IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC.. CR 4. See Heflin v. State, - Ind. -, 370 N.E.2d 895
(1977); Stewart v. State, - Ind. App. -, 354 N.E.2d 749 (1976). But see State v.
Roberts, - Ind. App. -, 358 N.E.2d 181 (1976).
'
751ND. CODE § 31-6-7-6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"'Ml. § 31-6-7-6(g).
...I& § 31-6-7-6(b).
'79Id § 31-6-7-6(g).
'M0kL § 31-6-7-6(f).
18 Id- § 31-6-7-6(c).
182Id § 31-6-7-6(d); IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC.. CR 4; State ex. reL Hunter v. Juvenile
Court, 261 Ind. 624, 308 N.E.2d 695 (1974).
'"
8 IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC.. CR 4(C).
"'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-6(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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caused by the defendant or court calendar congestion, 115 allowing a
ninety day continuance for the state if the child moves for discharge and
evidence presently unavailable to the state can be produced within that
time,188 and allowing the state a thirty day continuance if the child causes
any delay during the last thirty days. 18
7
Venue-Change of Venue-Change of Judge For a case where a
child is alleged to be a delinquent child original venue may be in "the
county where the child resides or in the county where the act occurred or
the condition exists."'18 8 Thus, the venue could be in several different
counties. Additionally, a case may be venued to the juvenile court of the
county of the child's residence prior to a dispositional hearing,1 9 or super-
vision of the child may be assigned to the same court. 190 There is no
automatic right to a change of judge; a change may only be granted upon
good cause shown by an affidavit filed at least twenty-four hours before
the fact-finding hearing.191 Though the change of judge section does not
specifically limit itself to delinquency or CHINS proceedings, an adult
charged with a crime in juvenile court would no doubt be governed by the
Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, 19 2 and, thus, by Criminal Rule 12;
the adult would then be entitled to a mandatory change of judge upon a
timely filing of a motion. The elimination of this automatic change of
judge from all other juvenile proceedings has been viewed as one of the
most significant changes effected by the new Code. 193
Conduct of Hearings, Burdens of Proof, Evidence All proceedings
in juvenile court involving adults charged with criminal charges or con-
tempt of court are to be tried in open court.194 It is within the discretion of
the trial court to exclude the public from other juvenile proceedings but it
seems that the juvenile court might be expected to more frequently exer-
cise its discretion in favor of public disclosure where it is alleged that the
child committed murder or a felony, or the alleged act was part of a pat-
tern of less serious offenses, because these two categories of cases are
singled out for special statutory mention for possible open proceedings. 195
"'Compare id. § 31-6-7-6(f), -6(i) with IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., CR 4(A), 4(C), 4(F).
"'Compare IND. CODE § 31-6-7-6(h) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC..
CR 4(D).
"'Compare IND. CODE § 31-6-7-6(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with IND. RULES OF CRIM. PROC.,
CR 4(F).
'8IND. CODE § 31-6-7-7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The provisions of the present statute are
confusing as to the question of venue. The juvenile court could receive information "that
there is within the county or residing within the county, a dependent, neglected or delin-
quent child" before authorizing an investigation and filing of a petition. IND. CODE
§ 31-5-7-8 (1976)(repealed 1979).
...IND. CODE § 31-6-7-8(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
19Id. § 31-6-7-8(b).
1911d. § 31-6-7-9.
"'See note 143 & accompanying text supra.
1"'Kerr, Indiana's New Juvenile Code, 12 IND. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1979).
"'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-10(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
11Id § 31-6-7-10(b). The public access or exclusion order is to be placed in the file of the
proceedings.
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An adult charged with a crime in juvenile court is entitled to be tried by
a jury unless he requests a bench trial.196 This presents an interesting con-
trast with the procedure in a criminal court where both the prosecuting
attorney and the court must consent to a bench trial.197 All other matters
in juvenile court, including delinquency proceedings, are tried to the
court. 1
98
The new Code has a general section on burdens of proof. Only proof
that a child committed a delinquent act or that an adult committed a
crime must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Any other
finding must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence.199 The possi-
ble change this may have created in the burden of proof upon the volun-
tariness of a child's confession has already been mentioned.200 Additional-
ly, several cases have indicated that a standard of "clear and convincing
proof" may be constitutionally required on such matters as termination
of the parent-child relationship. 201
The Code has codified several evidentiary principles for CHINS cases.
If the state introduces competent evidence of probative value that a child
has been injured, that at the time the child was injured, the parent, guar-
dian or custodian had care, custody or control of the child, or had legal
responsibility for the child, and that the injury would not likely have
been sustained except for the act or omission of his parent, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the child is a child in need of services. 20 2 Also,
evidence of prior or subsequent acts or omissions of the parent are ad-
missible in CHINS proceedings to prove the parent's responsibility. 20 3
Finally, the physician-patient and husband-wife privileges are abrogated
in CHINS cases.20 4 Obviously, these rules for the conduct of juvenile pro-
ceedings and codification of evidentiary rules will be important for the at-
torney for the state appearing in juvenile court.
'96Id. § 31-6-7-10(c).
'
9 7IND. CODE § 35-1-34-1 (1976).
'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-10(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
"'Id. § 31-6-7-13(a). Proof that an act of delinquency must be based upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt would include status offenses. See also Warner v. State, 254 Ind. 209,
258 N.E.2d 860 (1970).
2
°
0 See notes 136-13? & accompanying text supra.
"°'Sims v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on
other grounds sub. nom. Moore v. Sims, 47 U.S.L.W. 4693 (1979); Alsager v. District Court,
406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975); cf. Addington v. Texas, 47 U.S.L.W. 4473 (1979) (clear
and convincing proof standard is constitutionally required for civil commitment to mental
institution).
'IND. CODE § 31-6-7-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).203Id § 31-6-7-13(c). This is also the rule in criminal trials involving child abuse. Martin v.
State, - Ind. -, 372 N.E.2d 181 (1978); Corbin v. State, 250 Ind. 147, 234 N.E.2d 261
(1968).
21'IND: CODE § 31-6-7-13(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The elimination of these evidentiary
privileges in the Juvenile Code under this provision is limited only to CHINS cases.
However, the abrogation of the same privileges by the child abuse provisions of the
Juvenile Code are much broader and would apply to criminal prosecutions as well as
juvenile proceedings. Id § 31-6-11-8.
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Examinations of Juveniles-Emergency Orders Upon the motion of
a number of different persons, including the county welfare attorney or
the prosecuting attorney, or upon the juvenile court's own motion, the
court may issue an injunction to: (1) control the conduct of any person in
relation to the child; (2) provide a child with an examination or treatment;
or (3) prevent a child from leaving the court's jurisdiction.2 05 Persons af-
fected by such an order must be notified and a hearing held on the mo-
tion.20, If an emergency is demonstrated by sworn testimony a seventy-
two hour temporary restraining order may be obtained by following the
procedures of Trial Rule 65.207
The juvenile court may authorize mental or physical examinations or
treatment if no petition has been filed when a physician certifies that an
emergency exists and the child may be detained in a health care facility
while the emergency circumstances continue.2 0 8 Also, if the physician cer-
tifies that continued medical care is necessary to protect the child after
the emergency has passed, continued detention for a reasonable length of
time is authorized. 20 9 The prosecutor or welfare attorney may also request
an emergency change in the child's residence.
210
The attorney for the state, be he the county welfare attorney or the
prosecuting attorney, has a procedure available under these provisions to
obtain immediate medical attention for the victim of child abuse.
Appeals The section on appeals simply states: "Appeals may be
taken as provided by law. '2 1' This left open the question of whether or
not appeals may be taken from the granting of the waiver of a child to
adult court. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, has recently held that
an appeal from a waiver order valid on its face must abate pending a final
determination of the criminal prosecution authorized by the waiver.
21 2
JUVENILE RECORDS-LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS (CHAPTER 8)
The new Juvenile Code has provisions regarding the confidentiality of
both court records and law enforcement records. All records of the
juvenile court are confidential except those involving an adult charged
with a crime or criminal contempt of court.212 The records of the juvenile
court, however, are available to certain persons, including the prosecutor
or county welfare attorney, without a court order.21 4 Procedures for
2111ai § 31-6-7-14(a).
2-a1d § 31-6-7-14(b).
1 71d § 31-6-7-14(c); IND. RULES OF TRIAL PROC., TR 65.
2"1IND. CODE § 31-6-7-12(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
29ai § 31-6-7-12(a)(2).
2101a § 31-6-7-16.
2111d § 31-6-7-17.
'21 State ex. reL Snellgrove v. Porter Circuit & Juvenile Courts, Ind. -, 386 N.E.2d
680 (1979).
M'IND. CODE § 31-6-8-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
2"Td. § 31-6-8-1(b).
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release of other juvenile court information then depends upon whether or
not the records could be classified as "legal records" or "confidential
records." However, while the Code states that legal records "include
docket sheets, index entries, summonses, warrants, petitions, orders, mo-
tions and decrees, ' 215 the term "confidential records" is nowhere defined.
Presumably, every juvenile court record other than a legal record is a con-
fidential record.
A separate section of Chapter 8 controls the secrecy of law enforcement
records involving allegations of delinquency or a child in need of services.
However, the statute specifically provides that certain law enforcement
information is public information:
the nature of the offense allegedly committed and the cir-
cumstances immediately surrounding it, including the time,
location, any property involved, identity of any victim, a
description of the method of apprehension, any instrument of
physical force, the identity of any officers assigned to the in-
vestigation except for the undercover units, and the age and
sex of any child apprehended or sought for the alleged commis-
sion of the offense. Records relating to the detention of any
child in a secure facility, except for the name of the child, shall
be open to public inspection. 16
All other records are described as confidential. The prosecutor's office
and the county welfare department are entitled to the records of a law en-
forcement agency without specific permission from the head of the
agency.21" There are also provisions for a law enforcement agency to
release certain confidential information. 28 It is specified that the juvenile
court has no jurisdiction or control over law enforcement records.2 1 9
Other sections of the Code concern fingerprinting and photographing of
juveniles and expungement of records.2 2 0
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON JUVENILES (CHAPTER 10)
The 1978 Juvenile Code reenacted the Interstate Compact on
Juveniles 22l and the 1979 Code did not alter any of the 1978 provisions.
Three amendments were added to the Interstate Compact by the 1978
Code. One amendment concerned the return of runaways and another the
confinement of juveniles in out-of-state facilities. However, probably the
most important amendment as far as prosecuting attorneys are con-
cerned is the rendition amendment which basically allows the extradition
1Id § 31-6-8-1(a).
21
"
6 d. § 31-6-8-1.2(a).
'I&. § 31-6-8-1.2(b).
218Id. § 31-6-8-1.2(c), 
-1.2(d).
"
9 Id. § 31-6-8-1.2(k).2 2
Od. § 31-6-8-1.5,-2.
22Id § 31-6-10-1.
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of juveniles who have committed acts of delinquency. At least arguably,
there has been in the past no procedure for Indiana to bring back
juveniles who may have committed an act of delinquency and fled from
the state.222 While a juvenile could have possibly been extradited for an
alleged murder because original jurisdiction under prior law was in adult
court, the Uniform Extradition Act speaks of rendition for "treason or
felony. ' 2 3 A felony, other than murder, committed by a juvenile was
designated an act of delinquency rather than a felony.Therefore, even for
very serious crimes, juveniles might obtain immunity from prosecution
simply by fleeing the jurisdiction. The rendition amendment to the In-
terstate Compact was designed to change this.
CHILD ABUSE (CHAPTER 11)
One of the most important areas of concern for attorneys for the state
is child abuse. However, Chapter 11 is basically a reenactment of a law
that was already in effect on January 1, 1979224 and will not be discussed
at length here. It should be noted, though, that the terminology of the
present law has been changed to be consistent with the Juvenile Code.
For example, child abuse or neglect will mean a child in need of services
as defined in certain sections of the Juvenile Code.
225
CONCLUSION
The role of the attorney for the state in juvenile court has been a con-
fused area of the law for many years. Now that role is clearly defined.
While it is mandatory in certain circumstances, the attorney for the
state's participation in juvenile procedures is primarily a matter of his
own discretion. While there may be legitimate differences of opinion as to
what should be the duty of a prosecuting attorney or welfare attorney in
juvenile court, there can be little doubt that a definition of what those
duties are has been long overdue.
122The fact that an illegal extradition would not affect the legality of a conviction,
Massey v. State, - Ind. -, 371 N.E.2d 703 (1978), was of little consequence if officials
from other states would not cooperate in producing the child where there is no procedure
for extraditing him.223
IND. CODE § 35-2.1-2-3(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).224IND. CODE § 31-5.5 (Cum. Supp. 1979)(repealed 1979).2
IND. CODE § 31-6-11-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1979l

